European Security Realities

On 30 November 2022, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), in partnership with the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, held a roundtable on the future of European security following Russia’s war against Ukraine. The purpose of the roundtable was to facilitate discussions between Estonian and UK officials and experts on preliminary lessons identified from the war for European security and specifically the areas on which Estonia and the UK can continue to cooperate to enhance the security of Europe.

The speakers were senior UK and Estonian government officials with significant experience in foreign and defence policy, alongside experts on Russian foreign and military policy. The first session considered lessons identified at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare. The second session focused on options for better managing Russia in the future and what changes to the European security architecture might be required (see Annex for discussion points). This report contains a non-attributable summary of the discussions.

Summary of Roundtable Themes

Participants agreed that much of the future of European security is dependent on how the war on the ground in Ukraine ends. There was a general sense that Russia was likely ultimately to lose the war and must incur significant costs for deterrence to be re-established. The best-case scenario was that a future Russia would wish to buy into a rebuilt collective security system. The worst-case scenario was that Russia turns inwards and continues an aggressive and isolated path, and a North Korea-type scenario develops.

Russia has been significantly conventionally weakened by the war thus far and will need a further period of defence modernisation and doctrine development into the future. However, this does not mean that Russia will become a less dangerous defence and security actor. Therefore, Russia is likely to use unconventional and hybrid means more prominently in the short to medium term.

The confrontation with Russia remains a long-term struggle. All NATO nations, individually and collectively, need to understand that there is no return even to the 23 February 2022 security relationship with Russia.

Unity of purpose is the Western centre of gravity and must be maintained and protected at all costs. Moreover, the war has also highlighted NATO weaknesses and there must be a mutual recognition of these if the Alliance is to address them to be strong enough to guarantee the security of its member states.

The Estonian–UK Defence and Security Relationship

The Estonian–UK relationship and current levels of defence and security cooperation were described as ‘exemplary’ in terms of the bilateral relationship, multinationally through NATO and minilaterally through the Joint Expeditionary Force and other initiatives. The level of strategic integration is unprecedented. Each side could not wish for more from the relationship, with very few countries seeing eye to eye in the defence and security sphere to the same extent as Tallinn and London. However, there is still scope to build on this relationship – an example provided was the Estonian (as well as other Baltic and Nordic countries’) operation of a ‘total defence model’ that the UK could learn from in terms of building its own resilience.

A Joint Strategic Assessment on the War in Ukraine

The war in Ukraine has already changed the fundamentals of European security. Russia has not only attacked Ukraine, but the very principles of European security itself – national sovereignty, the inviolability of national borders and the use of aggression as a tool of statecraft, particularly directed at the civilian population. Moreover, the war has animated a common threat assessment for Europeans across all the defence and security dimensions – conventional, hybrid, nuclear, energy, protection of critical national infrastructure (CNI), emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), and food. As the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) have been exposed as poor compared with perceptions of them prior to the conflict, participants unanimously agreed that it is likely that President Vladimir Putin will ‘double down’ on non-conventional threats, such as nuclear and hybrid, as Russia does not delineate between conventional and unconventional levers or war and peace as separate constructs, and will always prioritise its defence and security policy over domestic considerations. Conversely, NATO’s significant challenges have also been exposed to its potential adversaries and competitors.

Russia has demonstrated a flagrant disregard for international norms for years. Conference speakers agreed that the current war, while ultimately Putin’s decision, should be considered as ‘Russia’s war’. Strategically, this is a war between Russia and the West, and it will not be won, or ended, kinetically on the battlefield in Ukraine. However, what happens on the battlefield will determine the foundations for the architecture which will follow. Despite multiple operational and tactical setbacks, Russia is not yet facing strategic defeat, although it is paying a heavier price than anticipated, both domestically and externally. Russia is still progressing its strategic intent. Its forces currently occupy approximately 20% of Ukraine and Moscow has established greater control over Belarus. Sanctions, while having an impact, are unlikely to bring Russia to its knees in the near future – Iran and North Korea were offered by one of the Estonian speakers as examples of states still functioning following decades of sanctions, capable still of developing advanced weaponry and military technology.

Estonian and UK officials agreed that Russia will likely be strategically weakened in the short term if Ukraine comes out of this war without concessions on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Should Russia gain any territory as a result of the war, it is the West and rules-based order that will be strategically weakened, not Russia. The poor Russian military performance presents opportunities for the Euro-Atlantic community. Yet, there needs to be a conscious understanding and effort if NATO is to take full advantage of the AFRF’s current weakness and the valuable insights on Russian vulnerabilities that the war has produced. Merely taking the additional time afforded to NATO to rectify weaknesses is insufficient and will not produce genuine strategic advantage. Moreover, NATO has been strengthened through unity and the adoption of its New Strategic Concept, and the imminent accession of two new members – Finland and Sweden. However, NATO must also be wary of the global context. While Ukraine has gained significant support through its informational campaigns in the West, the picture is more mixed elsewhere, such as in the Global South (broadly, the regions of Latin America, Asia, Africa and Oceania). It is important that the West recognises this and that the Russian narrative and propaganda gains traction outside English-speaking and other Western nations, which are actively targeted through its global network.

Europe must be resilient. Ukraine fatigue must not set in among the electorate or political leaderships.

Putin is likely using the winter and the shift of the ‘Special Military Operation’ to a stalemate on the ground to buy time to recover and enable ‘Ukraine fatigue’, as Western governments grapple with other political imperatives such as inflation, recession, and energy and other cost of living pressures.

Lessons Identified from the War in Ukraine

The war in Ukraine has challenged the strength of the AFRF and exposed its rigid command structures and culture, in direct contrast to Ukraine’s adaptability, flexibility and innovation. Despite a poor tactical and operational performance by the AFRF, however, Russia will continue to be a direct military threat. Previous underperformance of the AFRF, such as in Georgia in 2008, did not sufficiently prompt the requirement for change, but the strategic shock of its performance in 2022 may finally provide the recognition, and acceptance, of the necessity for wider cultural changes throughout the Russian defence and security community.

Participants highlighted that the Western assessment community had previously overestimated Russian capabilities and underestimated Ukraine and there is a risk that the reverse may now occur. It was also noted that this was also true in assessments of the relative strengths of the Taliban and Afghan National Security Forces and could reflect a strategic weakness in how NATO assesses its adversaries and partners.

There was a debate on the timeframes for NATO transformation and when the AFRF will pose a legitimate and credible conventional threat to Europe again. There was a warning that future credibility, for example, between 2030 and 2035, relied on decisions being made now and therefore there was actually not much time for action. The earliest assessments were that Russia could recover conventionally by 2023, with the caveat that additional personnel and equipment would be ‘operationally useful by Russian standards’ as its industry had retained industrial capacity and was able to secure components through illicit procurement and Iranian networks.

There is a serious risk that Ukraine runs out of ammunition, due to expenditure rates and limited stocks of NATO states, as well as a lack of spare industrial capacity to ramp up production in the short term. However, it was noted that ‘Ukrainians are good at sustaining momentum’ and were receiving more military aid before winter 2022 and continue to win the hearts and minds of Western media, people and thus governments to act on the relevant demand signals.

On the same day as the conference, RUSI published a report, ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022’ which one of the authors discussed in detail. The main findings pertinent to NATO defence planners are:

• There is no sanctuary in modern warfare. The enemy can strike throughout operational depth.

• Warfighting demands large initial stockpiles and significant slack capacity.

• Unmanned aerial systems and counter-UAS are essential across all branches and at all echelons.

• The force must fight for the right to precision. Precision is not only vastly more efficient in the effects it delivers but also allows the force to reduce its logistics tail and thereby makes it more survivable.

• For land forces, the pervasive ISTAR on the modern battlefield and the layering of multiple sensors at the tactical level make concealment exceedingly difficult to sustain.

Implications of the War in Ukraine for NATO

NATO, thus far, has responded well and in unity to a war which has been a real test for the Alliance. While not directly involved militarily, NATO is a critical actor and it was noted that the Russian pre-war proposals of December 2021 were primarily concerned with the US and NATO, not Ukraine. Words and non-military means did not deter Russia from launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and NATO, or its membership, must not self-deter and allow Russia the initiative to manage escalation. There was a recognition among the speakers that NATO did not do enough to deter Russia from its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, all NATO members need to understand, both individually and collectively, that there is no return to the relations with Russia that existed on 23 February 2022.

NATO’s New Strategic Concept, unveiled at the June 2022 Madrid Summit, drastically altered the NATO defence and deterrence posture in Europe and rebalanced away from the other core tasks of crisis management and cooperative security. The priority is now implementation and the delivery of the Madrid commitments quickly and fully to ensure credibility. Defence and reinforcement plans need to be resourced, with fighting formations stocked, trained, equipped and ringfenced for their mission.

All participants agreed that the unity demonstrated at Madrid is the Alliance’s centre of gravity and must prevail, as it would be naive to think Russia will not test Europe again. But Madrid is only the starting point and increased investments in defence and security should become the norm, not just in financial terms but also in manufacturing capabilities to obtain better outputs and therefore outcomes. The demand signal is there, and contracts need to be signed for long-term requirements to bring industry on board and ensure European strategic advantage. Increased defence spending and investment is predicated on political will and Allies have a duty to help. The transformation that NATO requires is not just process driven but one of mindset and culture. It needs to jettison the counterinsurgency mindset that has dominated the past 20 years of Alliance activity and get back to preparing for conventional warfighting as the requirements are very different.

Participants agreed that the NATO Vilnius Summit in June 2023 would be critical and hoped its outcome would be increased resilience and full implementation of the Madrid vision for the future of the Alliance. NATO plans need to be approved, the defence investment pledge revised and Finland and Sweden need to be welcomed as full members. NATO cannot and should not be scared of success.

The Future of Russia as a European Security Actor

The 70 years of general peace that Europe has experienced since the end of the Second World War was built on the presence of the US and its security umbrella and transatlanticism – an assessment that participants from both Estonia and the UK shared. By 1945 appeasement and the use of aggression were discredited on the European continent, but now appear again.

Russia’s war in Ukraine is pivotal, due to its scale, how it will change Ukraine as a nation, and how it will establish new norms of European security and reinforce the principle that larger states do not get a veto over smaller ones. Putin’s aggression cannot pay off, in any way, as other authoritarian states, especially China, are watching.

It was reinforced that Russia has no intention of losing its war in Ukraine and has identified Western unity as a centre of gravity which must be attacked, through producing economic pain, scaring the West into paralysis through nuclear and hybrid escalation, and providing false-hope narratives as traps to damage unity. Russia’s national strategy has been to deter responses by NATO while taking slices out of its neighbourhood, and the war has now changed attitudes and beliefs in Russia’s neighbourhood. Participants agreed that the status of Crimea is fundamental to the security future of both Russia and Ukraine and cannot be treated separately.

It was further noted that the West must also learn from its past mistakes to manage Russia better in the future – both the strategic failure to deter Russian designs on Ukraine from 2014 to 2022 and the grand strategic failure to deal with Russia adequately since the end of the Cold War and understanding the realistic military threat it poses. There must be a recognition that the West is stuck with Putin or ‘Putinism’ for some time. It would be a mistake to think that democratising Russia, such as the manner of Western engagement in the 1990s, will be possible. The imperialistic mindset is entrenched in Russian society that the West has only a very limited ability to influence.

Managing What Comes Next?

Participants were unanimous in agreeing that managing what comes next depends on how this phase of the war ends. However, regardless of the ultimate outcome, it was agreed that existing security frameworks need to be rethought and what can be salvaged and built upon needs to be identified.

The conference participants disagreed as to how the war on the ground would play out in 2023 and beyond but were steadfast in their belief that Russia must be defeated. Regardless of how the war ends, the European security order has transformed as Russia has flagrantly violated European and international norms by brutally invading a neighbouring country entirely unprovoked. Also, the significant write down in Russian combat power due to poor AFRF performance, with only modest investment from NATO Allies (primarily the US), has provided time and space for Europe to undergo its own military transformation as demanded by NATO’s Strategic Concept. Yet this investment to date has already strained Allied military capability and readiness, exposing NATO weaknesses, which must be urgently rectified. The multitude of Russian weaknesses on the battlefield must be decoupled with assessing the change in relationship between Russia and its partners, including Belarus, Iran and China.

A key aspect raised was that it is currently difficult to assess what has genuinely changed in Russia as a result of the war. The strategic intent – to occupy the whole of Ukraine and disrupt the European and international order – remains. Moreover, the values, world view and approach that Putin incarnates are likely to endure beyond Putin himself. Most of the criticism in Moscow is about not going hard and fast in the war, rather than the legitimacy of the war itself. The speakers agreed that while Russia might experience some destabilisation, there would be no ‘colour revolutions’ and that any challenge to Putin’s power would likely come from the right and not the liberal centre.

Linked to this was a sense among participants of a growing disconnect between Russian capabilities and the country’s ambitions and self-identity as a great power, which is fundamental to national identity. The foundations are built on Russia’s permanent seat at the UN Security Council and its nuclear status, its military might and its ability to act as a regional hegemon. Following the war, the last two are now under threat, which could cause Russia to act more aggressively and in an unpredictable manner, especially to compel its neighbours to act in certain ways and influence behaviours. In this context, it is likely that Russia will continue to exploit differences among NATO, and EU, members. Frozen conflicts are Russia’s comfort zone and their manipulation is key to Moscow’s exercise of power; therefore anything that is pushed on Ukraine towards that status is counterproductive, will look like a win for Russia and will therefore be unacceptable to NATO.

Assessing the European Structural Relationship with Russia

The discussions highlighted that European security, and the architecture underpinning it, must now be rethought. In terms of arms control, the war in Ukraine feels like the closing of an era, akin to the end of the Cold War. Certain components, such as the OSCE, especially the Vienna Document, endure, and New START is robust and remains critical. However, participants agreed that the era of cooperative security agreements that have characterised the previous 30 years do not feel like tomorrow’s world.

It was emphasised that Estonia and the UK are part of a community of democracies which take longer to make decisions, but make stronger decisions collectively, with legitimacy, transparency and accountability. Estonia and the UK want the war to end as soon as practically possible, but no concessions can be given to Putin. Therefore, these decisions must be made with a rational and coherent strategy which will benefit European security. There was doubt that this is moving quickly enough as Western countries are experiencing economic pain (inflation in Europe is currently highest in Estonia). A strategic breaking point of unity is approaching and some speakers believed it to be unsustainable, giving a particular warning about the pain of next winter for Europe, in addition to the current one.

The speakers all agreed that security guarantees must be provided to the future Ukrainian state, including a capable and integrated Ukrainian military, linked to industry, that can match Russia. However, there was no consensus on the form those guarantees should take. It should not be the uncertain assurance of NATO’s 2008 Budapest Summit commitment to eventual Alliance membership for Ukraine but must include an honest and realistic assessment of what kind of assistance Allies can supply to Ukraine in the long term, including force modernisation and NATO standardisation, and resupply for a future crisis. Strengthening Ukrainian deterrence of future Russian threats is critical and can be done through intelligence support, sanctions, military technical assistance and training programmes, which are all measures that would support Ukraine on its journey to join NATO.

Annex: Roundtable Discussion Points

Session 1: Defence Policy and Military Lessons from Russia’s War in Ukraine and Their Impact on European Security

• What are the principal military lessons to date of the war in Ukraine? What do these lessons mean for the UK, Estonia and NATO defence policy and posture?

• What is the UK strategic assessment of the war in Ukraine? How does this assessment change UK priorities in the Euro-Atlantic? What are the key takeaways and action items?

• What is the Estonian strategic assessment of the war in Ukraine? How does this assessment change Estonian priorities in the Euro-Atlantic? What are the key takeaways and action items?

• How best can NATO’s new Defence and Deterrence posture, as outlined within the Strategic Concept, be implemented? Where are the ongoing challenges? What are the realistic timeframes? Which additional adaptions seem necessary? What are the longterm consequences and challenges for NATO?

• What military threat does Russia now pose to Europe? How does this vary by subregion (Arctic, High North, Baltic Sea, Baltic states, Central and Eastern Europe, Black Sea, Caucasus)?

Session 2: Managing What Comes Next – The Future of Russia as a European Security Actor

• How has the European security environment changed following the war in Ukraine (politically, diplomatically, militarily)? What kind of threat environment is the West facing in the longer term? How can the West safeguard Euro-Atlantic security? What are the key challenges?

• Within this environment, how best can Russia be managed in the future? Which extant agreements can be salvaged? What are the requirements for new agreements?

  • Helsinki Final Act 1975.

  • Charter of Paris for a New Europe 1990.

  • NATO–Russia Founding Act 1997.

  • OSCE Istanbul Document 1999.

  • OSCE Vienna Document 2011.

  • Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1990.

  • Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 1987.

  • Treaty on Open Skies 1992.

  • Chemical Weapons Convention 1993.

  • New START 2011.

• How might Russian security policy towards Europe change due to the war in Ukraine? What will be the key indicators and warnings to identify these shifts?

• Which organisations, frameworks and initiatives within the European security architecture are most valuable for the UK and Estonia in managing Russia? Which initiatives are most productive for UK–Estonia cooperation? How can the UK and Estonia cooperate to meaningfully advance European security?

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Ed Arnold is a Research Fellow for European Security within the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His experience covers defence, intelligence, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, within the public and private sector. His primary research focus is on British defence, security, and foreign policy, specifically relating to the European security architecture and transatlantic cooperation. Ed has a particular interest in UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Reviews.